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THE UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT OR STATE IN
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW*
By EDWIN D. DICKINSON
IV
P ROBABLY no one in the British Empire or the United States
would question the doctrine that it belongs exclusively to the
political departments to recognize new governments or states. The
difficulties involved are those which arise in the application of a
doctrine so broadly stated. Not every situafion involving an unrec-
ognized government or state requires the decision of a question of
recognition. If the decision of a political question is not involved,
then it is entirely proper for the courts to take cognizance of a mere
de facto government or state. In what situations may the courts
appropriately take account of the facts? In what should they be
-guided solely by the decisions of the political departments?
If it is clear that the rule invoked in a given case applies only to
recognized governments or states, then the answer is easy enough.
The court has only to ascertain whether recognition has been granted
or withheld and apply the rule accordingly. Such a situation has
been presented the courts in a number of cases involving loans to
insurgents. Suppose, for example, that a revolution is fomented in
a neighboring state, that one of our citizens advances funds by way
of loan to the revolutionists, and that he later finds that the persons
to whom he advanced the money are perpetrating a fraud and appro-
priating the proceeds. The courts will give the lender no relief
because the insurgents have not been recognized, either as belligerents
or as an independent state, and loans to unrecognized insurgents to
promote revolution in a friendly state are illegal.4 Recognition is
* Continued from the November number.
44 See Bire v. Thompson, unreported (see 2 Sim. 222-3) ; Jones v. Garia
,del Rio, Turn. & Russ. 297 (1823); De Wfitz v. Hendricks, 9 Moo. 586, 2
Bing. 314 (1824); Yrisarri v. Clement, 2 Carr. & Payne 223, 228 (1825);
Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. 194 (1828); Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213
(1828) ; Habershon v. Vardon, 4 De G. & Sm. 467 (i8r) ; Emperor of Austria
v. Day, 3 De 0. F. & J. 217, 244 (x86i); Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38
(1852); KVNT, COrraNTAMuS, 2d ed., I, ri6. "With respect to loans to
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vital in this type of case because the legality or illegality of the
transaction depends upon it.45
Although the situation presented was not quite so clear, it is
believed that the early cases arising out of the disturbances in Haiti
and Santo Domingo were of the same general type. In those cases
the government asked the court to decree condemnation or impose
other penalty for carrying contraband to the enemy,48 engaging in
prohibited trade with the enemy,17 or breaching non-importation s
or neutrality statutes.4 9 In the cases involving contraband and pro-
hibited trade, it was for the political departments to decide when the
enemy's colony in revolt should cease to be regarded as enemy. So
long as they recognized no change in status, the courts properly
applied the rules as before. In the cases arising under the American
insurgents, if the insurgent Government has been recognized by the lender's
Government as independent or even as belligerent, loans made to it would be
equally valid with those made to a belligerent State, for the reason that this
amounts to a recognition of capacity to do all acts that can be lawfully done
in carrying on the war, of which the raising of loans is one; whilst voluntary
subscriptions would of course be illegal. But an advance of money, whether
by way of loan or subscription, to unrecognized insurgents, in arms against a
friendly Government, would be internationally improper, because loans for
promoting an insurrection cannot be regarded as coming within the range of
commercial business or as being free from political motive; and would for
this reason be illegal also in municipal law." CoBsB=, CAsrs, 3d ed., 11, 366.
What would be the position of the defrauded purchaser of bonds issued
by an unrecognized revolutionary government after the old recognized gov-
ernment had been completely overthrown (e. g., by Soviet Russia), or by the
undisputed de facto though unrecognized government of a recognized state
(e. g., by Me'ico prior to recent recognition)? No cases have been found.
It is submitted that in principle the defrauded purchaser should have relief.
It hardly seems necessary or appropriate to denounce traffic in such obliga-
tions as illegal. It may be that the two cases suggested should be distin-
guished, but this seems doubtful. On this see infra.
4G Similarly, while it is hardly conceivable that a court would award sal-
vage for rescuing a ship from the forces of a recognized government with
which the court's country was at peace, salvage has been awarded for saving
a ship from the forces of the unrecognized Bolshevild. The Lomonosoff, 37
T. L. R. 151 (ig2o). The question of recognition or not is material in the
decision of such a case.
AsThe Happy Couple, Stewart's Reports 65.
47 The Manilla, Edw. Adm. I; The Pelican, Edw. Adm., App. D.
48 Clark v. United States, 3 Wash. C. C. zox.
40 Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wh. 246.
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non-importation and neutrality statutes, the language of the statutes
was so explicit as to leave no alternative open to the courts.50
Does it follow, from the application of the principle made in
these early cases, that the ships of unrecognized revolutionists may
be seized and condemned as pirates? Astonishing as it may seem,
the United States District Court gave an affirmative answer to this
question in the case of The Amlnose Light,5 ' decided in 1885. The
decision is a good illustration of the erroneous results which are
likely to be reached when a court garners scintillating passages from
earlier opinions and applies them uncritically to a case which is
unlike the earlier cases. War is not piracy; and certainly the courts
may take cognizance of de facto war, just as Chief justice Marshall
did in R'ose v. Hiheiy, whenever it is necessary to do so in order to
determine the true character of a contest at sea. 2
The problem may become much more difficult when the govern-
ment of a foreign state comes into court seeking relief with respect
to state property or other public interest. If there is a contest
between rival governments in the foreign state, it is the recognized
government which has standing in court. The Emperor of Austria
once filed a bill in the English Court of Chancery to stop the printing
of paper money for the Hungarian revolutionists. When the plain-
tiff's counsel were about to reply to the contention that the Emperor
was not de jure King of Hungary, Lord Chancellor Campbell inter-
rupted, saying: "Surely that question depends merely on this,
ivhether the Plaintiff is acknowledged by her Majesty's government
as de facto Ing of Hungary, and we are bound to take judicial
r0 It may be anticipated that the terms "foreign state' or "foreign gov-
ernment," in penal statutes, at least, vill be interpreted to mean recognized for-
eign state or foreign government. Thus it is unlikely that the counterfeiting
within the United States of the bonds or other securities issued by an unrec-
ognized government would be regarded as counterfeiting the bonds or securi-
ties of a "foreign government" within the meaning of § 156- of the Federa
Criminal Code (35 Stat. L. 1117).
5225 Fed. 408.
52-See United States v. Hutchings, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 543, supra,
note x:; HYD2, IxTxRNA~iozqAxL LAw, I, § 233; OPPJaunaEI.r, INTgRNATIOXNXA
LAWv, 3d ed., I, § a73; Wiss, La DaOi'o miNTERNAvioAL APPLIQUL AUX
OUTranns civmvs, § 27. Compare The Lomonosoff, 37 T. L. R. 15r. Compare
also Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 6 Fed. Cas. 359; La Conception, 6
Wh. 235.
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notice of the fact that he is so acknowledged. We cannot enter here
into the question whether he is rightfully king.1
5 3
Suppose, however, that the recognized government has been in
fact completely overthrown and succeeded by a new de facto govern-
ment which has not been recognized.-' There are at least two pos-
sible situations. Either the political departments may continue to
regard representatives of the old government, now defunct, as the
accredited representatives of the foreign state, or the foreign state
may be for the time without any recognized representatives whatever.
The former situation has recently arisen as regards Russia; and it has
been held in several cases that only the recognized agents of Russia
have any standing in court to ask relief on behalf of the state which
they claim to represent. In the case of Yzw Rogdai," an action insti-
tuted by the Soviet Republic to secure possession of a Russian naval
transport, the United States Secretary of State certified that Bakhme-
teff, an appointee of the defunct Kerensky r6gime, was recognized as
ambassador from Russia, Bakhmeteff moved to discharge the attach-
ment, and the court granted the motion. The court remarked: "The
question at issue is one of state; it involves international relations,
and is primarily for the State Department. If, as contended by
libelants, it be granted that a revolution has taken place in Russia,
and that the Soviet Republic is in actual control, the question when,
if at all, such de facto government shall be recognized, is a political
one. It involves considerations of national policy, which are not jus-
ticiable, and touching it the voice of the Chief Executive is the voice,
53 The Emperor of Austria v. Day and Kossuth, 3 De G. F. & J. 217, 2221
(xS6). See The Hornet, 12 Fed. Cas. 529 (87o). See also the case of the
Chilean Ships, Clunet, XVIII, 868 (I891), and the case of the Chilean Funds,
ibid., 803 (18.90).
t".The recent reversal of America's traditional policy in respect to the
recognition of new governments or states, particularly as regards Mexico and
Russia, has presented this situation to the courts in some unusually difficult
cases. On the policy of the United States, see HYDn, INTgRNATIOAL LAN,
I, §§ 43-45; Gota, Tm rycoamriox PoLcY oV TB- UNTo STAxss, cbs. 4-8.
The recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks by the Allied Povers during the
World War exemplified the converse situation. In that instance a revolution-
ary movement received recognition as do facto before it had succeeded in estab-
lishing de facto control within ascertainable boundaries. See 13 Ami. Jou.
ImnT. LAw 93-5. So far as the author is aware, no cases involving that inter-
esting situation came before the courts.
r":278 Fed. 294 (192o).
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not of a branch of the government, but of the national sovereignty,
equally binding upon all departments." 0
In the second situation suggested above, the foreign state is for
the time being without any recognized representation whatever. Does
this mean that its public interests, pending recognition, are without
protection from the courts? The cases which have actually come up
for decision seem to point to an affirmative answer. On numerous
occasions, at the beginning of the last century, Lord Eldon held that
an unrecognized de facto government has no standing in court to
claim property of the former recognized government which it has
succeeded. 57 And it appears that it made no difference to Lord
Eldon' whether the foreign state had other recognized representatives
or not. The same rule has been applied in more recent instances.
It has been suggested that courts ought at least to make a dis-
tinction between the case in which an unrecognized de facto govern-
ment claims the public property of its predecessor and the case in
which such a government seeks relief with respect to some property
or other interest of its own. 5  The latter situation was presented in
Russian Socialist Federdted Soviet Republic v. Cibrarior," recently
before the courts of New York. One of the departments of the
Soviet Government entered into a contract with the defendant in
Russia for the purchase of moving picture machines and supplies
and delivered one million dollars to the United States commercial
attache at Petrograd to be deposited in an American bank subject to
draft according to the contract's terms. The money was deposited
in the National City Bank of New York. Thereafter the Soviet
Government commenced an action in New York to compel the
defendant to account for sums of money which it was alleged he had
been obtaining from the fund through fraud. The Supreme Court
ordered the appointment of a receiver, but the Appellate Division
reversed the order and held that the action could not be maintained. 0
t0278 Fed. 294, 296. See also The Penza: The Tobolsk, 277 Fed. 91
(1921). And see the case of the Chilean Ships, Clunet, XVIII, 868 (iSpx).
Compare United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 94 (1891).
57 The City of Berne v. The Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347, discussed supra.
GsBorchard, "Can an Unrecognized Government Sue," 31 YAr, L. bouR.
534-7-
51 ig N. Y. Supp. 543 (1921); I39 N. R. 259 (1923).
- It was remarked in the Appellate Division that "the question of whether
the plaintiff is a sovereign state must be determined by the court, not on its
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This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the privilege accorded foreign governments of suing in our
courts is a matter of comity,61 that without recognition there is no
comity, and that recognition and consequently the existence of com-
ity are exclusively for the political departments to decide.
Must it be said, then, that the funds of an unrecognized govern-
ment are free plunder for anyone who has a mind to help himself ?
We should not be overbold in our generalizations. There are still
more difficult situations which may come before the courts. When
these difficult situations arise, the courts may be impressed with the
disadvantages to society in peimitting foreign states to own valuable
property without assurance that there shall always be someone legally
capable of looking after it. They may be impressed with the danger
of serious international complications when such property becomes
a unique sort of res 2ndlins in the absence of any agent recognized
as capable of asserting the owner's rights. It may yet come about
own initiative, but by reference to the public acts of the executive and legist
lative departments of the government, of which the courts are bound to take
judicial notice." 191 N. Y. Supp. 543, 546. This was true enough. But
whether the plaintiff was a sovereign state or not this court was not required
to decide. The question at issue was whether the de facto government of
Russia had standing to compel defendant to account for the money which it
was alleged he had obtained through fraud. It is at least arguable that a de
facto government's standing in such a situation ought not to be denied.
Another attempt was made to recover on the same facts by bringing the
action in the names of the individuals who constituted the Soviet governmental
committee when the contract was made, but this attempt also failed. It was
held that the committee's right to bring an action on the contract had been
extinguished, and further that, in any event, the committee or its members
could have no greater right than their principal, the Soviet government.
Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 192 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1922).
o1 "Comity may be defined as that reciprocal courtesy which one member
of the family of nations owes to the others. It presupposes friendship. It
assumes the prevalence of equity and justice. Experience points to the expe-
diency of recognizing the legislative, executive, and judicial acts of other pow-
ers. We do justice that justice may be done in return." 139 N. E. 259, 26o.
"The use of the word 'comity' as expressing the basis of jurisdiction has been
criticized. It is, however, a mere question of definition. The principles lying
behind the word are recognized. Whether or not we sum them up by one
expression or another, the truth remains that jurisdiction depends upon the
law of the forum, and this law in turn depends upon the public policy disclosed
by the acts and declarations of the political departments of the government."
139 N. B. z5g, 26i.
MICHIGAN LAWV R9VMIW
that the courts, exercising the capacity for making distinctions which
is usually enlivened in a difficult situation, will find a way to take
cognizance of unrecognized de facto governments or states as such
without becoming involved in the decision of questions of recogni-
tion. Unless the courts can find a way to do this, or at least a way
to protect such property by some kind of temporary receivership
pending recognition, 2 it may become necessary to create a federal
custodian who will look after the property of foreign states in cases
in which recognition is withheld.
In another type of situation, closely related to the one just con-
sidered, the problem is presented to the court in connection with a
claim to exemption from jurisdiction. The usage of nations requires,
in the interest of comity and convenience, that extensive immunities
from the local jurisdiction shall be accorded to foreign states for
their various governmental agencies, including the government itself,
its diplomatic representatives, public ships, and other public property.
Is recognition a prerequisite to the enjoyment of such immunities?
The decided cases seem to point to an affirmative answer, but they
are not conclusive. The immunities of diplomatic representatives
are conceded to the agents of recognized states only when the diplo-
matic character has been acknowledged by the executive depart-
ment. 3 It might be inferred from this that no immunities would
be accorded the agents of an unrecognized government or state. The
latter case is distinguishable, however, and involves peculiar dif-
ficulties.
The immunities of public ships, in the recent English cases at
least, have been made to depend upon recognition. In 1919, tvo
Russian ships entered English ports, where they were arrested on
behalf of former Russian owners. One of the ships had been taken
from the Bolsheviki by the provisional government of Esthonia; the
other had been requisitioned by the provisional government of Arch-
angel. The court addressed two inquiries to the British Foreign
Office, desiring to know about the Esthonian and Archangel govern-
ments respectively. In the one case the Foreign Office replied that
provisional recognition had been extended to the Esthonian National
62 See Archangel Saw Mills Co. v. Baring Bros. & Co., 91 L. J. Ch. 325
r3 In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 463 (i8go) ; United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed.
94 (i89i) ; Savie v. City of New York, I93 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1g22).
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Council; in the other that, although British authorities were co6p-
erating with the government at Archangel, recognition had not
actually been granted. The court applied the rule of immunity
accordingly and released the Rsthonian ship, while the ship belong-
ing to the government at Archangel was detained.64
The question of the immunities to be accorded other- kinds of
public property belonging to a state without a recognized government
appears to have been rather acutely involved in the recent attempt
of the Oliver Trading Company to attach Mexican public funds in
New York City.a According to press reports, when the United States
Secretary of State intervened he intimated to the New York author-
ities that the public property of a foreign state is immune from
attachment. Does this mean that immunities may be enjoyed by a
foreign state even though recognition of its governmenf has been
withheld? Are we to distinguish claims to immunity advanced on
behalf of a recognized state without recognized government from
similar claims made on behalf of an unrecognized state? There is a
difference, but whether it is a difference of which courts will be able
to make practical advantage may be doubted.00
0- The Gagara [grg] P. 95; The Annette: The Dora [igrg] P. ios;
Dickinson, "International Recognition and the National Courts," x8 MIcH. L.'
Rev. 531-5. Further study and reflection have convinced the author that the
epitome which he attempted in the note cited above needs modification in sev-
eral particulars. See also De Visscher, "Les gouvemements itrangers en jus-
tice," Rsv. Di DR. INT., 3d series, III, x52, i6o-i; McNair, "Judicial Recog-
nition of States and Governments, and the Immunities of Public Ships," 13=-
iSr Ykir Boom or INT. LAW (19zi-22) 57-74.05 The author has seen nothing but press reports of this interesting case.
See the New York Times, Oct. 22, 1922, p. 16, col. i; Oct. 24, 192z, p. l,
col 2; Oct. 28, I922 p. I, col. 4; Oct. 29, 1922, P. 8, col. 1; Nov. I, 1922, p.
30, col. 2; Nov. 2, 192z, p. 24, col. i; Nov. 4, 1922, P. 3, col. 4; Nov. 5, 922,
p. 10, col. 1; Nov. 11, 1922, p. 5, col. 3; Nov. 13, 1922, p. 28, col. 2; Jan. 20,
1921, P. 3) col. 2.
Since the above was written, Oliver Trading Co. v. Government of Mex-
ico and National Railways of Me-ico, decided October II, 1923, in the United
States District Court for the southern district of New York, has been reported
in 7o N. Y. L. JouR. 2og. The decision contributes nothing that is new, for
the court, anticipating early recognition of the Mexican government by the
United States, delayed its decision until recognition had been announced and
then attributed retroactive effect thereto and vacated the attachment.
38 See De Visscher, "Les gouvernements 6trangers en justice," R lv. Ds DR.
Itm., 3d series, III, 154, 161-2; Li No RAND, LA n.co-mqNissAzicz INTSrA-
TIOZmiA, pp. 283-5; OppjuEnaeU, INT. LAw, 3d ed., I, § 75.
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If we are to assume that unrecognized states, and perhaps even
recognized states without recognized government, enjoy no immuni-
ties for their representatives, ships, or other public property, then it
would seem to follow logically that suits may be instituted against
the governments themselves. Apparently that was the theory upon
which counsel for the Oliver Trading Company proceeded in their
recent attempt to attach Mexican funds. In Wulfsohn v. Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republc,'" an action for the conversion of
furs confiscated by Soviet authorities in Russia, the lower New York
courts arrived at this astounding conclusion. The Supreme Court
observed that since there was no comity between Russia and the
United States the Soviet government could claim no immunity from
suit. "The inability to sue," said the court, "arises by reason of the
non-recognition of the Russian Soviet Government by the United
States government, but it does not seem that that fact creates any
immunity from suit." This view was approved by the Appellate
Division, where it was said: "It is a matter of common knowledge
that the defendant, though not recognized by the government of the
United States, is de facto, at least, the existing government of Russia,
'so as to represent in fact the sovereignty of the nation.'68 But, being
unrecognized and unacknowledged, it is not entitled to the immunities
accorded to recognized governments.""6
Since the above was written, Professor Quincy Wright has kindly called
the author's attention to a recent unreported case in which counsel for "the
United States of Mexico" asked the Massachusetts Superior Court for a tem-
porary restraining order to prevent the dissipation by a former Mexican
official of Mexican public funds deposited in a Massachusetts bank. On the
trial of the case, a statement was presented from the Under Secretary of
State to the effect that the state of Mexico was a recognized international
person, although without recognized government. A temporary restraining
order was granted. The negotiations which culminated in the recognition of
the Mexican government were pending at the time. Professor Wright is to
have an editorial on the case in Am. Joun. IxT. LAw, October, 1923.
07 1g9 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1922) ; 195 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1922) ; 234 N. Y.
372 0923) ; :2 MIcEr. L. RzV 789.
16 Quoting from Williams v. Bruffyr, 96 U. S. 176, z85.
60 x95 N. Y. Supp. 472, 475. Accord, Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Gov-
ernment, x97 N. Y. Supp. 467 (zgaz). "A new state springing into existence does
not require the recognition of other states, to confirm its internal sovereignty;
so long as it confines its action to its own citizens, and to the limits of its
own territory, it may dispense with such recognition; but if it desires to enter
into the society of nations, all the members of which recognize rights to which.
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The position taken by the lower courts in the Widfsohn case was
reversed in the Court of Appeals. It was there held that a foreign
government admittedly de facto70 could not be sued for an act of
confiscation withih its own territory, whether such government had
been recognized or not. 1' In the course of a notable opinion, Mr.
Justice Andrews observed that the result reached depended upon
"more basic considerations than recognition or nor-recognition by the
United States. '7 2 It depended upon the de facto situation in Russia.
He said: "The fact is conceded. We have an existing government
sovereign within its own territories. There necessarily its jurisdic-
tion is exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself. This is the result of its independence. It may be
conceded that its actions should accord with natural justice and
equity. If they do not, however, our courts are not competent to
review then They may not bring a foreign sovereign before our
bar, not because of comity, but because he has not submitted himself
to our laws. Without his consent he is not subject to them. Con-
cededly that is so as to a foreign government that has received recog-
they are mutually entitled and duties which they may be called upon recipro-
cally to fulfill, such recognition becomes essentially necessary to the complete
participation of the new state in all the advantages of this society. Every
other state is at liberty to grant or refuse recognition, and until such recogni-
tion becomes universal on the part of other states the new state becomes
entitled to the exercise of its external sovereignty as to those of the states
only by whom that sovereignty has been recognized." x95 N. Y. Supp. 472,
474. See De Visscher, Riv. i) Dr. Ilm., 3d series, III, .so-8.
70 "The Russian Federated Soviet Republic is the existing de facto gov-
ernment of Russia. This is admitted by the plaintiff. Otherwise there is no
proper party defendant before the court. It is claimed by the defendant.
The Appellate Division states that it is a matter of common knowledge." 234
N. Y. 372, 374.
71 "The government itself is sued for an exercise of sovereignty within
its own territories on the theory that such an act if committed by an individual
here would be a tort under our system of municipal law. It is said that
because of non-recognition by the United States such an action may be main-
tained. There is no relation between the premise and the conclusion." 234
N. Y. 372, 375.
72 "Whether or not a government exists clothed with the power to enforce
its authority within its own territory, obeyed by the people over whom it rules,
capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independ-
ent power, able to enforce its claims by military force, is a fact, not a theory.
For it recognition does not create a state, although it may be desirable." 234
N. Y. 372, 375.
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nition. * * * But whether recognized or not the evil of such an
attempt would be the same. * * * In either case to do so would 'vex
the peace of nations.' In either case the hands of the state depart-
ment would be tied. Unwillingly it would find itself involved in dis-
putes it might think unwise. Such is not the proper method of
redress if a citizen of the United States is wronged. The question
is a political one, not confided to the courts but to another depart-
ment of government." 73
The admission that the Soviet Republic was the de facto govern-
ment of Russia may have weakened the plaintiff's case, but admis-
sion or no, the decision is believed to have been thoroughly sound.
Indeed, the de facto character of the Soviet government, as the
Appellate Division remarked, was matter of common knowledge. If
the court had insisted upon making recognition the criterion of
immunity, it would have blundered unwittingly into the very sort of
delicate political question which it has been the reason of the rule in
regard to recognition to avoid.
Accepting the final decision in the Wilfsohn case as sound, what
shall we say when the same principle is invoked in support of other
claims to immunity in suits involving the diplomatic representatives,
ships, or other public property of unrecognized de facto governments?
May it be that the Wudfsolu case has at last opened the way for a
much needed reconsideration of some of the more important aspects
of our problem?
In still another group of cases, recognition has been thought to
have a bearing upon the capacity of a foreign government to bind the
state and hence succeeding governments by the obligations which it
incurs and by its acts. Suppose, for example, that a new de facto
government arises following a revolution in a foreign state. Sup-
pose that this new de facto government is presently recognized. Our
citizens may now enter into contracts with the new government with
a measure of security, for if the new government is later overthrown
and the old government restored the courts will regard the restored
government as bound by the contracts. 74
Suppose, however, that recognition is withheld from the new de
facto government. With whom may our citizens contract? Not
73 234 N. Y. 372, 375-6.
74 Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers & Co., 38 Ch. D. 348 (1888).
See also the Neopolitan Indemnity, Mooma, INr. AxwT., V, 4575.
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with the unrecognized de facto government, for it appears that
neither the courts nor the political departments are prepared to give
adequate protection."7 Shall it be with the representatives of the old
recognized government which is now defunct? It seems absurd that
there should be a magic in continued recognition which is capable of
perpetuating the capacity of a defunct government. But this is
apparently the theory of some of the recent cases. The old Russian
Imperial Government, for example, was interested, possibly to the
extent of one and one-half millions of dollars, in an agreement in
regard to some munitions contracts. After the Bolshevik revolution,
the old Russian Supply Committee in America, purporting to act for
the Russian government, assigned Russia's interest in this agreement
to American corporations. When the obligor objected that these
corporations might not be in a position to give a good discharge for
the debt, the United States Secretary of State certified that Bakh-
meteff was ambassador from Russia, Bakhmeteff certified that the
Supply Committee had authority to make the assignment, and the
court, regarding these certificates as conclusive, held that Russia had
been effectively divested of its interest in the agreement.7
We come, finally, to situations like that presented in the Pelzer
case with which we began, situations in which the only contest is
between individuals about matters of private right. Surely in such
situations the courts ought to take cognizance of the existence of
75 See the incident involving the Amory oil concession in Costa Rica, New
York Times, Feb. 97, 192r, p. 3, col. 2; April 20, 1921, p. 17, col. 4; Nov. 2,
1922, p. 24, col. 2. See also "Legal Position of Foreign Concessionaires in
Russia," 3 JOuRNA, oF CONATIoxA, LAW, x-S.7 0 Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 253
Fed. r52 (1918), 258 Fed. 363 (1919). "The question at issue being, on this
phase of the case, whether the Russian government has effectually divested
itself of all interest in the moneys now in the hands of the defendant, this
court holds that the certificate of the personal representative of that govern-
ment, duly accredited to and recognized by the government of the United
States, certifying that the official who assumed to assign and release any such
interest as his government might have was authorized to act in behalf of his
government in making such assignment and release, is competent and con-
clusive evidence, which the court below properly held to be decisive." 258
Fed. 363, 369. The District Court remarked: "no tribunal in this country will
ever subject defendant to a second payment-and we have no concern with
remote possibilities as to the action of any foreign tribunal." 253 Fed. 152,
i57. But the possible action of a foreign tribunal might be something of real
concern to a corporation engaged extensively in international trade.
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unrecognized de facto governments or states and of the capacity of
de facto governments to do such acts as are required in the appoint-
ment of administrators, the adjudication of titles, the collection of
taxes, the issuing of currency, the creation of corporations, or even
the confiscation of property.
77
The unfortunate effect upon private rights and the security of
business transactions of refusing to take account of the facts is well
illustrated in the recent English case of Lutther v. Sagor & Cont-
pany.78 The plaintiff in this case was a Russian company which had
been engaged in the manufacture in Russia of veneer or plywood.
The Soviet government confiscated its mill and manufactured stock.
Subsequently the Soviet government sent to Great Britain a com-
mercial delegation under the headship of L. B. Krassin. Erassin
sold a part of the confiscated veneer to the defendants. The plaintiff
claimed the veneer when it arrived in England. The defendant's
right to keep it depended upon the effect to be attributed to the Soviet
decree of confiscation. The British court took the view, erroneously,
it is submitted, that the validity of the Soviet decree depended upon
the recognition which Great Britain had extended to the Soviet gov-
ernment. Communications from the Foreign Office on this point
were admirably calculated to mystify. The defendant's solicitors
were informed that "His Majesty's Government assent to the claim
of the Delegation to represent in this country a State Government of
Russia." To an inquiry from the plaintiff's solicitors, on the other
hand, the Foreign Office replied as follows: "I am to inform you
that for a certain limited purpose His Majesty's Government has
regarded M. Krassin as exempt from the process of the Courts, and
also for the like limited purpose His Majesty's Government has
assented to the claim that that which M. Krassin represents in this
Country is a State Government of Russia, but that beyond these
propositions the Foreign Office has not gone, nor moreover do these
expressions of opinion purport to decide difficult, and it may be
very special questions of law upon which it may become necessary
for the Courts to pronounce. I am to add that His Majesty's Gov-
77 Upon the theory that recognition is retroactive in effect, courts do regard
the acts of an unrecognized de facto government as valid whenever the ques-
tion arises after recognition has been extended. See note 43, supra.
78 Reported as Aksionairnoye Obschestvo Dlia Mechanicheskoyi Obra-
botky Diereva A. M. Luther v. Sagor & Co. [1921] I K. B. 456, ['921] 3 K.
B. 532.
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eminent have never officially recognised the Soviet Government in
any way." 70 Upon this evidence it was held in the King's Bench
Division that the Soviet government had not been recognized and
that the plaintiff should recover its plywood. The defendants
appealed. Meanwhile the British government concluded a trade
agreement with the Soviet government and the Foreign Office
announced that the Soviet Republic had been recognized as the de
facto government of Russia.SO The Court of Appeal approved of
the decision in the King's Bench Division, as based upon the evi-
dence then presented, but unanimously reversed the decision and
nonsuited the plaintiff because of the recognition which had been
granted meanwhile to the Soviet Republic. 81 The unfortunate results
which ensue when private rights may be thus tossed about in the
eddying current of international politics are too obvious to require
emphasis.
A more sensible result is reached in the recent New York case
of Sokoloff v. National City Bank." The action was brought on
account of the bank's failure to repay in rubles at its Petrograd
branch as agreed. The defense was the closing of the Petrograd
branch and the confiscation of its assets by the Soviet government.
The plaintiff objected that the court could take no cognizance of the
Soviet government or its acts so long as it remained unrecognized83
The court said that in so far as the defense necessarily ascribed
attributes of sovereignty to the Soviet r6gime it must be regarded
as insufficient. It was held, however, that the defense could be sus-
10 Little wonder that courts have had difficulty -with cases involving unrec-
ognized governments or states when foreign offices are capable of such extra-
ordinary equivocation.
sO On so-called de facto recognition, see Baty, "So-called 'De Facto' Rec-
ognition," 31 YAZv L. Joun. 469-488; De Visscher, "Les gouvernements &ran-
gers en justice," Riv. DZ DL. INT., 3d series, II, 152, 155-8; Hershey, "Notes
on the Recognition of De Facto Governments by European States," 14 Am.
Jomn. INT. LAw 499-518; Podesta Costa, "R~gles i suivre pour Ia reconnais-
sance dun gouvemement de facto par des Etats itrangers," Rv. Gtbr. 3. DL.
INT. PUB., 2d series, IV, 47-59.
81 See Marshall v. Grinbaum, 37 T. L. R. 93 (1921). See also Bmnrsa
Yva Boox or INT. LAW (1g21-22) 57, 59; 35 HAnv. L. Rxv. 6o7; Rlv. Dz
DR. INT., 3d series, III, i58-i6o, 163-5, 324-5; 31 YM.i L. Joun. 82-6.
2- 199 N. Y. Supp. 355 (:922).
83 The opinion given in another suit behveen the same parties contained a
dictum supporting the plaintiff's contention. 196 N. Y. Supp. 364, 367 (19"2).
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tained by proof of actual conditions prevailing in Russia. The dis-
tinction suggested seems to have been superfluous, but it may have
helped the court to reach the desired result notwithstanding some of
the earlier recognition decisions. Mr. Justice Ford said: "While
this court may not recognize the Soviet government as sovereign,
and therefore possessing power to confiscate property or debts, as
must be done in respect of a foreign state which has been recog-
nized either de facto or de jure, it does not follow that we must
assume a state of anarchy in Russia. True, by legal fiction, for some
purposes which appertain more particularly to the other, the "polit-
ical," branches of the government than to the judiciary, we must con-
tinue to assume that the old imperial government is the only sov-
ereign government in Russia. 4  Nevertheless, so far as the issues
raised upon this motion are concerned, I can see no valid objection
to perniitting the defendant to allege and prove upon the trial the
actual conditions prevailing in that great country. Indeed we know
as a matter of common knowledge that there is a government there
which has been functioning in some fashion for five years or more,
and that it is not the imperial government of the czars. Facts are
facts, in Russia the same as elsewhere." 5
V
That is the nub of the matter. "Facts are facts, in Russia the
same as elsewhere." The writer believes that courts have unneces-
sarily magnified the difficulties of their dilemma. On the one- hand,
there is the de facto situation abroad. On the other, there is the
decision of the political department in regard to recognition. If the
84This was, of course, a misstatement. The Kerensky government was
recognized by the United States after the overthrow of the old imperial gov-
ernment of the Czars.
''1.99 N. Y. Supp. 355, 359. Compare Russek v. Angulo, 236 S. IV. 131
(i92i). See .Cechanowicz v. Highland Park State Bank, z94 N. W. 531
(1923) ; Carmen v. Higginson, i4o N. E. 246 (19z3).
Suppose a court should be presented with any one of the numerous con-
flict of laws situations in which the controlling rule is to be derived from the
law of a foreign jurisdiction. And suppose, further, that the foreign juris-
diction happens to be that of an unrecognized state or of a recognized state
without recognized government. Can theire be any doubt that the court ought
to take cognizance of the rule prevailing in the foreign jurisdiction, in order
to do justice between the parties concerned, and that in so doing it would
encroach in no way upon the sphere of the political departments of government?
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two are in harmony, there is of course no difficulty at all. If the
de facto situation abroad is uncertain and the issue in doubt, it may
be assumed that the courts will rely upon the political department.
The only real difficulty arises when the facts are well known, or
capable of being established by proof in the usual way, and are not
in harmony with the political department's decision.
It is clear that in English and American lav the courts must
never anticipate the decisions of the political department. If, in the
case before the court, the application of the rule requires a decision
on the question of recognition, then clearly the court should regard
"the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered," to use Chief
Justice Marshall's phrase, until the political department has acted.
It seems clear, in any case, that the court should be conservative
wherever there is danger of embarrassing the political department
in the conduct of foreign relations.
There is still room, however, without encroachment upon the
executive or legislative function, for the judiciary to concede much
to the status of an unrecognized de facto government or state.
Indeed much has been conceded, although the concessions seem to
have been made in a somewhat halting and inconsistent fashion.
It seems likely that eventually we shall find it desirable to attribute
to an unrecognized but indisputably de facto government the capacity
to appear in court and ask protection for state property or other
public interest. Probably some jurisdictional immunities, analogous
to those conceded to recognized governments, will eventually have to
be conceded to unrecognized de facto governments. Otherwise the
courts may become involved in controverted questions of interna-
tional politics of the very kind they have been most anxious to
avoid. Certainly, in situations involving only matters of private
right, it is possible for the courts to take cognizance of an unrec-
ognized de facto government or state and apply the rule accordingly
without in any way encroaching upon the functions of other depart-
ments of government. While the precedents are admittedly con-
fusing, it is believed that in principle this is what courts ought to
do in situations similar in general to those presented in Luther v.
Sagor & Co., Sokoloff v. National City Bank, and Pelzer v. United
Dredging Co.
By way of conclusion, therefore, the writer would offer the fol-
lowing suggestions. The recognition of a foreign government or
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state is exclusively a political question. The existence of a foreign
government or state is exclusively a question of fact. No general
principle yet formulated is sufficient to resolve all the situations
which arise. Clearly an existing though unrecognized government
or state is capable of acts which courts -will frequently find it dif-
ficult to disregard. Frequently such government or state is the only
instrumentality capable of moving adequately on behalf of the people
it represents for the protection of public property, or other interests.
It seems desirable, therefore, that it should have some standing in
court, at least for certain limited purposes, and that it should be enti-
tled to some jurisdictional immunities. However diffident courts may
naturally be about making any concessions in these respects, there
appears to be no good reason at all why, in suits between individuals
about matters of private right, the courts should not frankly take
cognizance of unrecognized de facto governments or states and of
their capacity to affect private rights in a great many different ways.
It is a serious matter when the executive uses recognition as a blud-
geon in the contests of diplomacy, but the situation may become
doubly serious if courts feel constrained thereby to ignore what is
going on abroad in a rather intricately integrated world.
No4--In the first installment of this article, discussing the proposition
that courts may take no cognizance of unrecognized governments or states,
the author remarked that "In situations like that presented in the Pezer
case, it admittedly results in a miscarriage of justice." 1 upra, p. 3r. The
author's remark was prompted by a sentence in Mr. justice McAvoy's opin-
ion in the Pelzer case (see supra, p. 3o, note 5) and also by the obvious prob-
ability that the rule of the case, if applied consistently, would be invoked in
other cases by unworthy litigants to obstruct or prevent a decision on the
merits. Important facts not in the record, and of course not disclosed by
anything appearing in the reports, have since come to the author's attention
which make it very clear that there was no miscarriage of justice in the
Pelzer litigation. It would have been better, therefore, had the author's com-
ment read as follows: 'In situations like that presented in the Pelzer case,
it delays or even prevents a decision on the merits and may eventuate in a
miscarriage of justice."-TE4 A'UTHOR.
